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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a preliminary analysis of homeopathy from the 
perspective of the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science. In this 
context, Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend’s solution to the problem will be given 
respectively and their criteria will be applied to homeopathy, aiming to shed 
some light on the controversy over its scientific status. It then examines 
homeopathy under the lens of demarcation criteria to conclude that 
homeopathy is regarded as science by Feyerabend and is considered as 
pseudoscience by Popper and Kuhn. By offering adequate tools for the analysis 
of the foundations, structure and implications of homeopathy, demarcation 
issue can help to clarify this medical controversy. The main argument of this 
article is that a final decision on homeopathy, whose scientific status changes 
depending on the criteria of the philosophers mentioned, cannot be given. 
Keywords: Demarcation Problem, Scientific Status of Homeopathy, 
Falsifiability, Puzzle-solving, Anarchist Method, Pseudoscience 
 
BİLİM FELSEFESİNDE SINIR ÇİZME SORUNUNUN ANALİZİ VE 
HOMEOPATİYE UYGULANMASI 
 
ÖZ 
Bu makale, bilim felsefesinin önemli konularından biri olan sınır çizme 
sorunu açısından homeopatinin bir ön analizini sunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, 
Popper, Kuhn ve Feyerabend'in sınır çizme sorununa yönelik çözümleri sırasıyla 
verilecek ve onların ölçütleri, homeopatinin bilimsel durumu üzerindeki 
tartışmalara ışık tutacak şekilde uygulanacaktır. Homeopatinin Feyerabend 
tarafından bilim, Popper ve Kuhn açısından ise sözde bilim olduğu sonucuna 
varmak amacıyla, homeopati sınır çizme ölçütleri çerçevesinde 
incelenmektedir. Sınır çizme tartışması homeopatinin temellerini, yapısını ve 
sonuçlarını analiz etmek için yeterli araçları sunarak bu tıbbi tartışmayı 
netleştirmeye yardımcı olabilir. Bu makalenin temel argümanı, bahsi geçen 
filozofların ölçütlerine bağlı olarak homeopatinin bilimsel durumu hakkında 
nihai bir kararın verilemeyeceğidir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sınır Çizme Sorunu, Homeopatinin Bilimsel 
Durumu, Yanlışlanabilirlik, Bulmaca-çözme, Anarşist Metot, Sözdebilim 
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I. Introduction 
In the history of science, the scientific status of disciplines has been 
mainly discussed in terms of their methodology, theory and research 
especially at the early stage of their development. The same situation appears 
in homeopathy as well. The scientific position of homeopathy is still a matter 
of debate from the beginning of its emergence until now. The discussion of 
what can be considered as science or what can be considered as 
pseudoscience is known as the demarcation problem. Assessing the 
demarcation problem from the viewpoint of the philosophy of science is 
related to how to distinguish science from non-science1 or more specifically 
from pseudoscience2.  
Homeopathy can be classified as the specific example of the 
demarcation issue in the philosophy of science, particularly with its 
implication to practical fields. It is surprising to seeing that the philosophers 
of science have not sufficiently tended to this discipline. This work will try to 
fill this gap to do so. Firstly, the theoretical background of demarcation 
problem will be provided by Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn and Paul 
Feyerabend. Subsequently, homeopathy will be examined in terms of their 
criteria. This article will finally present an investigation of homeopathy from 
the view of the philosophy of science, which tries to elaborate the debate over 
its scientific status.  
 
II.Popper and His Method of Falsification  
The idea of demarcating science from pseudoscience is largely 
argued by Popper. He considers pseudoscience as non-science3 and assesses 
the problem as the “key to most of the fundamental problems in the philosophy 
of science”4. The logical empiricist claims that science can be separated from 
non-science with the verification of facts and observations. However, Popper 
argues that verifiability cannot be a scientific standard of scientific theory or 
hypothesis5. Thus, the demarcation principle has to be falsifiable rather than 
verifiable: “statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as 
                                                          
1 Resnik, D. B. (2000), “A Pragmatic Approach To The Demarcation Problem”, Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 249. 
2 Laudan, L. (1983), “The Demise Of The Demarcation Problem”, in Physics, Philosophy 
and Psychoanalysis Edition, Dordrecht, Reidel, p. 112. 
3 Evans, R. (2005), “Science, Technology, & Human Values, Demarcation Socialized: 
Constructing Boundaries and Recognizing Difference”, Sage Publications, Vol. 30, No. 
1, p. 4. 
4 Popper, K. (2014), Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 
Routledge, London, p. 42. 
5 Hansson, S. O.  (2008), “Science And Pseudo-Science”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/pseudo-science/. 
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scientific, must be capable of conflicting with possible or conceivable 
observations”6. 
Theories are evaluated as scientific if they are incompatible with 
probable empirical observations, and conversely, if they are compatible with 
all possible observations. The important idea is that empirical arguments and 
evidences are able to characterize the science which can be falsified with 
these discoveries. This situation is clearly explained by Popper with his 
following writing: 
“But I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it 
is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest that not 
the verifiability of the system but the falsifiability of the system is to be taken as 
a criterion of demarcation. In other words, I shall not require of a scientific 
system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a positive 
sense; but I shall require that its logical form be such that it can be singled out, 
by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an 
empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience”7. 
Besides, Popper refuses inductive logic, resulting precisely from its 
failure of offering a favourable demarcating feature of the empirical, non-
metaphysical, character of a theoretical system8; alternatively saying, it is not 
able to present an appropriate standard for demarcation. Popper claims that 
the scientists, in fact, do not use induction in order to get accurate information 
in their works. 
Nevertheless, in the traditional view such as philosophical opinions 
put forward by Bacon and Newton, the very first step is pure observation in 
the formation of theories. In other words, observations and experiments are 
initially used by the scientist after reaching the hypotheses or theories. 
Popper characterizes this problem as the problem of induction and he 
explained that “It is usual to call an inference ‘inductive’ if it passes from 
singular statements (sometimes also called ‘particular’ statements), such as 
accounts of the results of observations or experiments, to universal statements, 
such as hypotheses or theories”9. 
Then he continues; “now it is far from obvious, from a logical point of 
view, that we are justiﬁed in inferring universal statements from singular ones, 
no matter how numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn 
out to be false: no matter how many instances of white swans we may have 
observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white”10. 
                                                          
6 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, p. 39. 
7 Popper, K. (1959), The Logic Of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London, pp. 40-41. 
8 ibid., p. 56. 
9 ibid., p. 4. 
10 ibid., p. 4. 
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We could summarise his attitude like ‘theory prior to observation’. 
Induction could not be defined as a typically reliable method of scientific 
investigation and illation. For this reason, he declares that demarcating 
science from pseudoscience on the base of its inductive methodology cannot 
be possible. Therefore, his solution to this problem is deductive approach, 
which can be seen as follows: 
“If the singular conclusions turn out to be acceptable, or verified, then 
the theory has, for the time being, passed its test: we have found no reason to 
discard it. But if . . . the conclusions have been falsified, then their falsification 
also falsifies the theory from which they were logically deduced”11. Hence, 
Popper prefers advocating deductive testing of theories rather than inductive 
testing overall. 
According to Popper, refuting the theory with conceivable events 
determines whether it is scientific or not. In other words, theory should be 
evaluated as scientific if it is falsifiable12. Hence, falsifiability can be taken as 
a demarcation criterion but not verifiability. Each genuine test of a scientific 
theory, in that case, is an enterprise to refuse or to falsify it from a logical 
standpoint, and one true counter example falsifies the whole theory. For 
instance, when we observe lots of white swans, we cannot express this 
statement: ‘all swans are white’.  However, observing only one black swan will 
be enough to reach the statement that ‘some swans are not white’. 
Accordingly, it can be said that although scientific laws are not completely 
verifiable, it is certainly falsifiable13. 
Scientific results did, and can, come up in a variety of means and a 
scientist in a particular case might mis-formulate a theory for his or her own 
interest whilst it is of no consequence the philosophy of science is concerned. 
There is no practice like induction operating as the path to the destination of 
scientific theories. This view is also seen by Albert Einstein with his statement 
that “there is no logical path leading to the highly universal laws of science. They 
can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like intellectual love of 
the objects of experience”14. 
From Popper's perspective, problems occur prior to observations in 
science. Furthermore, a well-known case can be illustrated here to 
understand this statement. Sir Isaac Newton discovered gravity, because the 
problem of falling objects on the earth arose first, then the observations in 
exploring the supporting experiments and evidences are conducted. It is also 
                                                          
11 ibid., p. 10. 
12 ibid., p. 27. 
13 Thornton, S. (1997), “Karl Popper”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/popper/. 
14 Einstein, A. (1935), The World As I See It, Trans: A. Harris, John Lane, London, p. 125. 
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the common proceed in scientists researches that only after a problem is 
grappled can the plan of observations be constructed. Otherwise, following 
the inductive method (i.e. observations prior to problems) scientists would 
be obliged to observe every single event (including those which could be 
largely irrelevant, misleading and distracting) in real life to draw a 
trustworthy conclusion which is highly impossible15. 
In the light of this criterion of demarcation, disciplines such as 
physics and chemistry are accepted as science among others. Even if 
Psychoanalysis has many valuable and authentic conclusions, it is evaluated 
as pre-science by Popper, since psychoanalytical theories could not reach the 
recognition standard as scientific theories until they are proved to be 
falsifiable. Popper argues that Astrology must be regarded as one of the basic 
examples of pseudo-science. Astrologers, as he identified and insisted 
through the focus on testability, do not shoulder the responsibility of the 
theory being falsified, such that any setback can be claimed as liable for 
without the whole theory being at stake: 
“Astrologers were greatly impressed, and misled, by what they believed 
to be confirming evidence – so much so that they were quite unimpressed by any 
unfavourable evidence. Moreover, by making their interpretations and 
prophecies sufficiently vague they were able to explain away anything that 
might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophecies 
been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability 
of their theory”16.  
Consequently, a theory can be evaluated as scientific when and only 
when it distinguishes the class of basic statements into the two non-empty 
sub-classes as follows: 
(a) “First, the class of all those basic statements with which it is 
inconsistent (or which it rules out, or prohibits): we call this the class 
of the potential falsifiers of the theory. 
(b) Secondly, the class of those basic statements which it does not 
contradict (or which it ‘permits’)”17. 
We can put this more briefly by saying: whether a theory is capable of 
being falsified or not depends on the existence of its possible falsifiers.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Thornton, “Karl Popper”, 1997. 
16 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, p. 49. 
17 Popper, The Logic Of Scientific Discovery, pp. 65-66. 
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III.Kuhn’s Puzzle-Solving Criterion 
Thomas Kuhn composed their own views, like many other 
philosophers, based on Popper's statements on the demarcation issue. 
Although Popper and Kuhn reached an agreement on what can be classified 
as science or pseudoscience (e.g. astronomy and astrology), they presented 
opposite philosophical stands in the argument of demarcation hallmark18. 
As it can be seen from the former chapter, the major focus should be 
given to very unusual and infrequent cases when the whole theory is in peril. 
However, this method cannot be utilised to summarize the whole scientific 
approach in Kuhn's opinion19 (1974: 812). As he claimed: “Popper's 
demarcation criterion is adequate and necessary for the distinguishing of 
empirical domains from non-empirical ones; but it is insufficient for 
distinguishing mature sciences from proto-sciences, or even from astrology, 
without the addition of a fair number of new elements”20. 
Kuhn asserts that only in 'normal science' period, which occurs at the 
uncommon turning point of scientific revolution, the criteria can be found to 
distinguish science from other non-science attempts. “In fact, there does exist 
a demarcation criterion which serves to distinguish mature sciences from all 
other disciplines, empirical and non-empirical alike: a special and 
characteristic kind of progress”21. 
In the normal science period, scientists’ responsibility is to solve 
puzzles provided by 'paradigm', other than to question basic theories. The 
definition of paradigm is given in Kuhn's book, “The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions”, which also clarifies how a new paradigm replaces the old one in 
a scientific revolution. He argues that scientific progress, in contrast to 
common belief, is not only a permanent progress towards increasingly true 
theories but the idea that more truths about the world are generated by 
science is broken by revolutionary changes in paradigm22. 
According to Kuhn, paradigm is the commonly accepted 
measurement concerning how to view the world by the scientific society23. 
An old paradigm can be modified or changed by a new one when its puzzle-
solving function dramatically lessens the confidence of scientists. This whole 
                                                          
18 Mayo, D. G. (1996), “Ducks, Rabbits, And Normal Science: Recasting The Kuhn's-Eye 
View Of Popper's Demarcation Of Science”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, Vol. 47, No. 2, p. 280. 
19 Kuhn, T. (1974), “Logic Of Discovery Or Psychology Of Research?”, P.A. Schilpp, Open 
Court, La Salle, p. 812. 
20 Quay, P. M. (1974), "Progress As A Demarcation Criterion For The Sciences", 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41, No. 2, p. 154. 
21 ibid., p. 154. 
22 Kuhn, T. (1970), The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 82. 
23 ibid., p. 98. 
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development can be considered a scientific revolution. As the new paradigm 
is normally superior to the old one in solving puzzles, the scientific society 
hence replace its common beliefs to this new standard and method (while in 
some occasions it is due to the former generation of scientists ending or losing 
powers). After the new paradigm is generally accepted and the revolution 
comes to an end, we then reach the period which Kuhn names as ‘Normal-
science’24. 
The new paradigm is distinguished from the old one and it is not 
compulsorily closer to the truth in general. While a new paradigm is able to 
solve puzzles, the old one is not able to respond to the problems of the earlier 
by using a different conception of science. That is why the older paradigm 
could be neglected due to lack of interest, fashion and so on. 
When it comes to puzzle-solving, the present theory is both affirmed 
and needed to provide the definition to the puzzle. From Kuhn's perspective, 
“it is normal science, in which Sir Karl's soft of testing does not occur, rather 
than extraordinary science which most nearly distinguishes science from other 
enterprises”25, and that is why a demarcation criterion must acquire the 
reference of the relevant testing in normal science. It is the ability of puzzle 
solving that is seen as the demarcation criterion for Kuhn and he sees it as the 
main characteristic in normal science26. 
A comparison of astronomy and astrology can be illustrated here to 
offer a more explicit understanding of Kuhn’s opinion on demarcation. 
Astronomy has a puzzle-solving action and should be classified as science 
consequently. For instance, if an astronomer experience scientific failures in 
his theory, he can solve the emerging puzzle by improving measurement 
methods, correcting formulas or adjusting the theory. Conversely, there is no 
such puzzle for astrologers since in that area “particular failures did not give 
rise to research puzzles, for no man, however skilled, could make use of them in 
a constructive attempt to revise the astrological tradition27”, which results in 
the fact that astrology has never been a real science. Neither because of the 
failure of being falsifiable nor even because of the explanations of failed 
assumptions from astrologers. It is the puzzle-solving engagement to be key 
in distinguishing science and non-science disciplines28. 
However, Popper expressly shows his disagreement on Kuhn's 
demarcation criterion that considering the capability of puzzle-solving as the 
standard to demarcate science from pseudoscience can be misleading29. Since 
                                                          
24 ibid., p. 112. 
25 Kuhn, “Logic Of Discovery Or Psychology Of Research?”, p. 801. 
26 ibid., p. 803. 
27 ibid., p. 804. 
28 Hansson, “Science And Pseudo-Science”. 
29 Popper, K. (1974), Reply to My Critics, Open Court, La Salle, p. 977. 
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there are various puzzle solving activities can be found in astrologers’ work, 
according to Popper, and hence Kuhn's criterion commits him to define 
astrology as a science. Unlike Kuhn, Popper grouped puzzles to “minor 
problems which do not affect the routine” but he supposed Kuhn's assertion 
can create “the major disaster” of a “replacement of a rational criterion of 
science by a sociological one”30. 
 
IV.Feyerabend and Anarchist Method 
Paul Feyerabend is also concerned with the demarcation problem in 
science as he approached the problem from a different point of view. 
According to Steedman, Feyerabend is one of the most efficient and 
productive figures in the philosophy of science, since scientific methods and 
theories of knowledge have been affected by Feyerabend because of his 
unusual and anarchist scientific methodology31. 
Defining the meaning of anarchy can help us to understand his 
anarchist views clearly. Drawn from the Oxford Dictionary, anarchy means “a 
state of disorder due to absence or non-recognition of authority or other 
controlling systems”32. From this point, the idea that the rigid rules, 
regulations and laws of science are stipulated by scientists, was rejected by 
Feyerabend33. 
It might appear that he did not use a scientific method to gain 
accurate and precise information. In fact, Feyerabend obtains plenty of 
precise information from scientific research through his anarchist method. 
Moreover, he established his own anarchist theory of knowledge and tried to 
explain the anarchist method in his book ‘Against Method’. The main claim in 
the anarchist method of Feyerabend is as follows; “there are no 
methodological rules or prescriptions that are immune from criticism in the 
production of scientific knowledge. If anyone insists on a rule it must be 
‘anything goes’ or something equally vacuous”34. From this quote, it can be seen 
that Feyerabend was against any rules and methods of science, because he 
claimed that strict rules and laws in science impede the growth of 
knowledge35. For these reasons, the appropriate scientific methodology for 
Feyerabend was described as ‘anything goes’. He coined the ‘anything goes’ as 
                                                          
30 Popper, Reply to My Critics, pp. 1146-1147. 
31 Steedman, P. (1982), “Theory and Society”, Springer, Vol. 11, No. 5, p. 724. 
32 Oxford Dictionaries, Anarchy, 2018. 
33 Hands, D. W. (1977), “Against Method: Outline Of An Anarchistic Theory Of 
Knowledge By Paul K. Feyerabend”, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 11, No. 4, p. 898. 
34 Steedman, “Theory and Society”, p. 725. 
35 Nagel, E. (1977), “Against Method: Outline Of An Anarchistic Theory Of Knowledge 
By Paul K. Feyerabend”, American Political Science Association, Vol. 71, No. 3, p. 1134. 
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a scientific method in order to use in his own scientific works rather than 
other methods. 
Additionally, Feyerabend also maintained his anarchist method for 
the demarcation problem. He had been questioning that the commonly 
disputable issue about demarcation was insidious since practically a 
demarcation criterion is not the determinant in science development given 
another thought. But some philosophers, instead, were searching a 
justification of position from which public discourses can be under the 
domination of science36. 
As Feyerabend argued, science does not actually possess a unique 
region following its logic or method meanwhile there was no claim made by 
scientists to particular authority can be formally and universally endorsed37. 
Dating back from the very elementary scientific exercise, there has been no 
rule or means not to be broken down or opposed for the purpose of 
progressing scientific awareness. Science cannot emerge automatically 
without human's consistent questioning and intellectual pursuing38. It can be 
evaluated that the border of science is meaningless because science, in fact, 
itself does not need a demarcation criterion.  
The key point is that he did not totally reject non-scientific 
alternatives as distinguished from the Popper and Kuhn. For example, non-
scientific options in pharmaceutical activities such as selecting alternative 
medicines sometimes might work better than some scientific procedures 
(due to the limited knowledge of the involvers at a certain time etc.). For 
instance, controlling diabetes could be easier with some alternative 
medicines than normal medicines. Feyerabend claimed that science should 
not be conceived as the one and only source of knowledge. As asserted by 
Feyerabend, religions and astrology cannot be used for researches but 
evaluated as caricatures of the real science and that is why they can only 
provide us some partial information other than broadening our horizons of 
knowledge39. However, it is clear that science, on the whole, is more effective 
than traditional beliefs40. 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Taylor, C. A. (1996), Defining Science: A Rhetoric of Demarcation, University of 
Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, p. 113. 
37 Feyerabend, P. (1978), Science In A Free Society, Verso, London, 1978, p. 19. 
38 Feyerabend, P. (1975), Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of 
Knowledge. Verso, London, p. 56. 
39 ibid., p. 78. 
40 ibid., p. 82. 
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V.Homeopathy Under the Lens of Demarcation Criteria 
Homeopathy is the pharmacological discipline based on the doctrine 
of Similia Similibus Curentur41 - let likes be cured by likes - and is defined by 
the Oxford English Dictionary as “a system of complementary medicine in 
which ailments are treated by minute doses of natural substances that in larger 
amounts would produce symptoms of the ailment”42. The history of 
homeopathy dates back to the works of Samuel Hahnemann in the late 18th 
century, who first coined the word ‘homeopathy’. The concept of homeopathy 
is originated from the words of ‘homoios’ and ‘pathos’, using as ‘similar’ and 
‘suffering’ in Greek language respectively.  
Although Hahnemann graduated from the medical department, he 
maintained his life by translating medical and scientific books since he left 
practicing of medicine due to its chaotic position in his time. He “became 
disenchanted with the unhygienic and often brutal medical techniques such as 
purging, emetics, bloodletting, and the use of large doses of chemical agents 
such as mercury and arsenic that were used in the late 1700s”43. He thinks that 
science and its consequences was not controlled by any certain law and 
principle44. Under these doubts while translating a part of Scottish physician 
Dr. William Cullen’s Materia Medica from English to German, a fanciful 
method of treatment implemented with cinchona bark attracted 
Hahnemann’s attention and he started to seek the questions of “How the drugs 
act and cure diseases? How cure occurs? Why diseases become chronic and what 
are the obstructions to cure?”45 (1984: vi). These are accepted as the 
fundamental questions of the medicine as well. After that he worked on 
various substances by experimenting them on himself and others in order to 
improve new treatment technique, homeopathy. Finally, he reached the point 
that “what a substance can produce in a healthy person can also cure in a sick 
person”46. 
As it is known that Hahnemann ceased to work on medicine due to 
its lack of law and principle. He thinks that old-fashioned medicines 
concentrated on methods of treatments that were excessive and constantly 
gave more harm than good. In his own words “It is not I who is at fault, it is the 
art of medicine which is wrong. I know that I can prescribe as well as the best of 
                                                          
41 Vithoulkas, G. (2002), The Science of Homeopathy. B. Jain Publishers, New Delhi, p. 
9. 
42 Oxford Dictionaries, Homeopathy, 2018. 
43 Synovitz, L. B. and Larson, K. L. (2013), Complementary and Alternative Medicine for 
Health Professionals: A Holistic Approach to Consumer Health, Jones and Bartlett 
Learning, Burlington, p. 128. 
44 Vithoulkas, The Science of Homeopathy, p. 4. 
45 Hahnemann, S. (1984), Organon Of Medicine, 6th. Edition, Trans. RE Dudgeon, B Jain, 
p. VI. 
46 Vithoulkas, The Science of Homeopathy, p. 4. 
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those who now give medicine, but if I am convinced that the sick will do better 
with no medicine at all – God help me! I will practice no more”47. After 
discovering48 (or developing) homeopathy, he claims that homeopathy is able 
to resolve these shortcomings and it could cure all or virtually all diseases49.  
Hahnemann explains his arguments about homeopathy in his book 
‘Organon of Medicine’. On the basis of his views, the principles of homeopathy 
can mainly be grouped under five main titles.  
 The fundamental principle is law of similar in homeopathy. Through 
research and practice, he claimed that the body is capable of healing 
itself and the ‘like cures like’ principle is the main argument for the 
treatment of person at first. A substance producing disease in a 
healthy person is used to reveal a remedial reaction in someone who 
possess a similar disease50 (Hahnemann, 1984: paragraph 22-28).  
 The second principle of homeopathy is the idea of fundamental force 
which is named as `Vital Force`. According to this principle, Vital 
Force organizes all the functions and sensations of the body. Holistic 
approach is seen in this principle, when a person gets sick, sickness 
affects not only his/er body but also his/er mind and spirit. Disease 
and related symptoms show up because of the instability of Vital 
Force. Proper homeopathic remedy helps to stimulate and 
strengthen the person's immune system and eliminates the 
symptoms of disease while balancing the Vital Force.  
 The third principle concerns the making and the implementation of 
the drug, the `Potentized Remedy`. In contrast to other medicines, 
homeopathic cures made from natural substances which is extracted 
from plants, minerals or animals. These medicines are seriously 
diluted during preparation process and they are shaken by being hit 
on a hard surface before application, because it is found that more 
dilution of substance reduces the side effect of medicines.  So that the 
dynamic nature of the drug is activated by this way. 
 The fourth and the fifth principle are minimum dose and single 
remedy. In the homeopathic treatment method, the least amount of 
medicine is given to the patient in order to increase beneficial effects 
and decrease side effects of it. The patient's response to the drug is 
                                                          
47 ibid., p. 4. 
48 Even if the discipline of homeopathy was known by Hippocrates and Paracelsus 
before, Hahnemann was the first person to provide practical application to 
homeopathy in the art of healing (Vithoulkas, 2002: 3). 
49 Loudon, I. (2006), “A Brief History Of Homeopathy”, Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine, Vol. 99, No. 12, p. 608. 
50 Hahnemann, Organon Of Medicine, paragraph 22-28. 
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effective in determining the dose of the drug. Only one homeopathic 
cure is given at any one time.  
As it can be seen that the discipline of homeopathy generally based 
on the law of similars, Vital Force, potentized remedy, minimum dose and 
single remedy. What is important in the homeopathic treatment method is the 
patient and individual, not the disease. While contemporary medicine aims to 
destroy microbes, homeopathy activates the defence mechanism of the body 
to overcome the disease by the theory of similarity. Like cures like is the 
concept of personalized treatment, which distinguishes homeopathy from a 
contemporary medicine with a sharp line. According to this theory; there is 
no sickness, there are sick people. To conclude, homeopathy treats the 
individual rather than the disease and the treatment is individualised for each 
patient. 
To discuss scientific status of homeopathy it was initially observed 
that homeopathy wants to make sick people healthy like other medical 
approaches with its particular techniques and practices. In general sense, the 
scientific status of homeopathy is discussed by two questions, which include 
theoretical and empirical inquiry.  
 “Is there a plausible theory that explains how homeopathy could work? 
Is it the sort of intervention that we would expect to be effective, given 
what we know about the world? 
 Is there empirical evidence that homeopathy is effective?”51. 
Those who criticize homeopathy generally state that it is insufficient 
to answer these two questions. Any empirical evidence cannot be found in 
this discipline. Even if there is, it would be inadequate and unsatisfactory for 
the validity of homeopathy. From a theoretical perspective, homeopathy is not 
seen as reasonable as chemistry and medicine since we have no idea about 
how it works. That is why, homeopathy should not be considered as science.  
On the other hand, supporters of homeopathy are divided into three 
parts. First, they assert that there are ample explanations about how 
homeopathy can be effective. Second, the others claim that they don't need a 
theory which explains how homeopathy works, because the evidence of its 
effectiveness is quite powerful. The last, they question the necessity of 
scientific explanations, since they think that homeopathy has a different 
paradigm and cannot be evaluated by the criteria of western science.  
 
 
 
                                                          
51 Sehon, S. and Stanley, D. (2010), “Evidence And Simplicity: Why We Should Reject 
Homeopathy”, Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 276. 
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VI.Conclusion 
The discussion whether homeopathy is science or pseudoscience 
enters specifically into the field of philosophy of science. It is known that 
Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend approach this issue from a different point of 
view. According to them, the discipline of homeopathy has to meet their 
demarcation criteria (if any) to be considered as science.  
Many claims in homeopathic method are based on the former studies 
which show positive results. In homeopathy, it is accepted that if a treatment 
was effective and helped to recover many people in the past, it will be effective 
in the future. As Hahnemann states in his book; “we could cite very many 
examples of homoeopathic cures brought about by natural diseases with similar 
symptoms. But since we require precise and indubitable data we shall confine 
ourselves to the small number, always true to type, arising from unvarying 
miasms, which give them a distinct name. Smallpox, prominent among them 
and so notorious for its many violent symptoms, has removed and cured a host 
of ills that have similar symptoms. How common are the ophthalmias of 
smallpox and how violent, even to blindness! Through inoculation smallpox 
completely and permanently cured chronic eye inflammation in a case cited by 
Dezoteux and in another cited by Leroy.  A person who was blind for two years 
after the suppression of a scalp eruption completely recovered his sight after 
smallpox, according to Klein”52. This method of reasoning is acknowledged as 
induction: to achieve universal statements through inference from the 
particular statements, which is found by Popper as an unpleasant way of 
obtaining scientific knowledge. As Popper says that the method of induction 
cannot be used in scientific research since it is not able to provide accurate 
information to researchers. However, application of homeopathic treatment 
relies on induction. Homeopathy requires verification in order to maintain its 
scientific position. However, Popper presents the principle of falsification in 
order to assess theories as scientific. He states that verification of data cannot 
strengthen the scientific status of homeopathy because it is not the criterion 
that distinguishes science from pseudoscience. As long as a theory is falsified 
by facts, it can be accepted as science. In other words, no matter how many 
instances of disease we observe, this does not justify the conclusion that all 
diseases are treated by homeopathy. Even if the treatment made by 
homeopathy was wrong, it would not be blamed by its supporters, because 
they would seek different approach or experiment to justify their theory with 
their findings rather than denying it. From Popper’s point of view, his criteria 
would not be met by homeopathy, because he would claim that homeopathic 
claims must be falsifiable to be considered scientific. For this reason, 
homeopathy should be considered as pseudoscience from his point of view.  
                                                          
52 Hahnemann, Organon Of Medicine, paragraph 46. 
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Besides, Popper wants to demarcate not only psuedoscience but also 
metaphysics from science as he refuses metaphysical statement because it 
impedes the development of science. According with Popper’s demarcation 
between empirical science and metaphysics, to belong to empirical science, a 
hypothesis or theory must have empirically testable consequences, but the 
idea of Vital Force in Homeopathy is not based on facts and cannot be tested 
by experiment. The concept is used as metaphysically by Hahnemann: “in the 
state of health the spirit-like vital force (dynamis) animating the material 
human organism reigns in supreme sovereignty” (1984: paragraph 9). That is 
why, it should be considered as non-science or even metaphysics, but it can 
optimistically be considered by Popper that homeopathy may be a useful 
guide to science like Democritus’ contribution to atomic theory.   
From Kuhn’s perspective, if a discipline is being dominated by a 
paradigm that constitutes puzzles to be solved, it can be regarded as mature 
science. Kuhn states that in normal science period, paradigm is not under 
debate and leaves no more obscure or important question. However, 
homeopathy does not meet the requirements of paradigm given by Kuhn, 
because the scientific status of homeopathy and its application to medicine 
such as the Potentized Remedy are still open to discussion. Homeopathy does 
not have puzzle solving tools and workable paradigm to successfully guide its 
work. It leaves questions unanswered and is not able to solve puzzles. 
Homeopaths and supporters of homeopathy claim that their theory belong to 
the part of a new paradigm for medicine, Kuhn would find this claim 
unfounded, since homeopathy cannot discard competing paradigms and 
cannot defeat current western medicine. Actually, homeopathy has no 
paradigms at all. That is why, homeopathy would be accepted by Kuhn as non-
science and classified not in the period of normal science but in the period of 
pre-science due to lack of dominating paradigm. 
Lastly, Feyerabend’s stance is more radical than others. He argues 
that there is no scientific method common to all scientific discipline and 
therefore ‘anything goes’ in science. Feyerabend’s analyses of science can be 
applied to homeopathy as well. Feyerabend refuses any methods in science 
and rejects the idea that the method of Western science is superior to the 
methods of other sciences, which is why he finds any methods or demarcation 
criteria unnecessary in science. From his perspective of ‘anything goes’, 
homeopathy might be considered to be a scientific theory and it can be judged 
as science like western medicine.  
To sum up, drawing the boundaries of science is one of the significant 
problems in the philosophy of science, and this problem has been discussed 
by many philosophers. Three main approaches have been examined within 
this paper related to the problem of demarcation in science and its application 
to homeopathy: the falsifiability criterion used by Popper, the puzzle-solving 
tool given by Kuhn, and the anarchist method created by Feyerabend. 
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Popper and Kuhn’s approaches might be considered as two opposite 
sides. While Popper claims that the falsification is the proper way to divide 
science and pseudoscience, Kuhn argues that puzzle solving plays a crucial 
role for showing the differences of science from other disciplines. However, 
Feyerabend’s approach is radically different from Popper and Kuhn, because 
he denies any methodological rule which restrains the science in a negative 
way. As a result of their criteria being applied to homeopathy, it is completely 
pseudoscientific and should be denied from Popper’s side. In terms of Kuhn, 
homeopathy is prescientific, it first needs to create its paradigm and then 
develop a period of normal science. For Feyerabend, homeopathy can be 
considered as science. As a review of their findings, it can be understood that 
comprehending the scientific status of homeopathy varies depending on their 
criteria. For this reason, it is not possible to make certain decision on its 
scientificity. 
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